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When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that 
what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most 
part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come 
down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to 
those primordial ‘sources’ [den ursprünglichen “Quellen”] from which 
the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite 
genuinely drawn. (ga 2: 29/sz 21) 
Heidegger’s reading of a-lētheia in a privative, etymological sense 
of Un-verborgenheit, “uncoveredness,” has been cause for controversy 
among philosophers and philologists alike.1 In the complexities of this 
debate, it is quite easy to overlook the adjective in the phrase which de-
scribes Heidegger’s theory of truth in Sein und Zeit §44: das ursprüngli-
che Phänomen der Wahrheit, the primordial truth-experience.2 In the 
passage of time the wellspring of original meaning goes dry, covered 
over by secondary interpretation. The task of destroying the history 
of ontology Heidegger lays out in §6 Sein und Zeit thus informs and 
inspires Heidegger’s reading of alētheia as a-lētheia. The hermeneutic 
task of historical investigation is analogous to the broader uncovering 
of the truth-experience. Both require us to return to the primordial 
origin, the source prior to its derivative manifestations. Taking this cue 
from Heidegger himself, we would do best to understand his reading 
of alētheia by looking to its earliest development. The pronouncements 
on the Greek sense of truth in Sein und Zeit will seem peremptory and 
unjustified to whoever does not trace Heidegger’s etymology back to his 
interpretive readings of the Greek texts themselves. Heidegger’s own 
primordial truth-experience of alētheia as a-lētheia occurred in and 
through his direct encounter with substantial interpretive problems in 
Greek thought.
 I will first lay out most of the relevant features of Heidegger’s pri-
mordial truth-experience independently. I will then demonstrate how 
this idea directly proceeds from Heidegger’s readings of Parmenides 
and Heraclitus, who present truth as existing alongside untruth. The 
pre-Socratic experience of truth is the experience of a gradual, never 




This primordial, always ongoing truth-experience leaves a deep struc-
tural impression, however implicit, upon the apparently more binary, 
rigidly formal theories of truth in Plato and Aristotle. 
I . heIdegger’s vocabul ary of phenomenologIcal truth 
Truth as a-lētheia will occupy the empty space Heidegger has cleared 
by his objection to the correspondence theory of truth. In Sein und 
Zeit §44, Heidegger gives a brief history of the theory. Aristotle lays 
the groundwork for the attempt to draw a correspondence between 
mind and world with his claim that the experiences of the soul are 
homoiōmata, “likenesses” of things. Aquinas develops this idea in 
Aristotle and determines that truth should be an adaequatio of these 
two factors, a correspondence of mind and fact. The theory remains 
in the modern age, untouched even by Kant. Heidegger objects to the 
correspondence theory because it attempts to relate an ideal kind of 
being (intellectus) to a real kind of being (res). Judgement is a real act, 
an assessment of entities, but its content remains ideal. An ontologi-
cal clarification of intellectus is needed to posit any relation of mind 
and thing, but precisely such a clarification is lacking (ga 2: 284–88/
sz 214–17).
 Phenomenology begins with this buried question, the question of 
how truth presents itself phenomenally, in the existential being which 
belongs to Dasein. Heidegger presents phenomenology as the neces-
sary method of ontology in Sein und Zeit §7. The phenomenological 
truth is a disclosure of Being (Erschlossenheit von Sein) which is nothing 
less than the transcendental truth (veritas transcendentalis) which has 
evaded metaphysics (ga 2: 51/sz 38). In Heidegger’s description of 
the Wahrheitsphänomen, the truth-experience, the phenomenological 
method acquires an epistemic scope, as it lets “that which shows itself 
[ta phainomena] be seen from itself [apophainesthai] in the very way in 
which it shows itself from itself” (ga 2: 45–47/sz 34–35). This “show-
ing itself” is truth as a phenomenon, the immediate and immanent 
moment of realization that arises in the truth-experience.
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 Contrary to most modern thinking on the subject, truth is not 
merely a property of depersonalized propositions. In a helpful example 
in Sein und Zeit §44, Heidegger asks us to consider a man who, with his 
back turned, asserts that a picture hanging on the wall is askew. He then 
turns around and sees that this is indeed the case. Though the original 
proposition is “true,” the truth-experience only arises in the confir-
mation of the proposition, the moment when it shows itself as true (ga 
2: 287–89/sz 217–18). This truth-experience is distinct from the truth 
of a proposition. We can make true statements without knowing them 
in their truth, without having a truth-experience, as, for instance, in 
the case of hearsay. Moreover, as Sean McGrath points out, not every 
true statement is a confirmation of some verifiable external fact. Purely 
existential assessments such as “Peter is a true friend” are only verifiable 
“through action in an inter-subjective situation.”3 Heidegger discusses 
truth at this pre-propositional level of its phenomenal recognition.
 Dasein’s capacity for discovering and describing the truth, phenom-
enally or propositionally, cannot be divorced from its world-contexture, 
its being-in-the-world.4 It is through the world that beings become 
open and closed to Dasein, and so Dasein’s access to beings is de-
scribed through varied forms of the German word schließen, “to close.” 
Disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) is the aspect of Dasein’s being-in-the-
world crucial for Heidegger’s account of truth as discovered within the 
world. The philosophical tradition has recognized this disclosedness, 
but only in problematically metaphysical terms. In Descartes, this 
existential-ontological structure of Dasein was figuratively described 
as something ontic, and termed our lumen naturale, the illumination 
natural to being a human. But for Heidegger, the metaphor of inherent 
human enlightenment must be replaced with a more active, verbal 
metaphor of “closing” which more richly captures the complexity of 
existential being. In being open to the phenomena, Dasein practices an 
always already established familiarity with its factical world. Dasein 
“carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off [Un-
verschlossenheit]” (ga 2: 177/sz 133). Disclosing indicates the character 
of beings as being “laid open” (Aufgeschlossenheit) within Dasein’s 
world (ga 2: 101/sz 75).
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 On the other side of the schließen metaphor, Dasein’s openness and 
access to its world is equally its enclosure therein. Dasein’s being is 
wholly contained within its world. In Sein und Zeit §28, Heidegger 
equates disclosedness with the etymology of Da-sein itself. The “there” 
is the disclosure which always comes along with Dasein. “By its very 
nature, Dasein brings its ‘there’ along with it. If it lacks its ‘there,’ it 
is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein…Dasein is its 
disclosedness” (ga 2: 177/sz 133). This same formulation of Dasein as 
its disclosedness also appears in the truth-experience discussion in Sein 
und Zeit §44. “In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and dis-
closes and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially 
‘true’. Dasein is ‘in the truth’” (ga 2: 292/sz 221). The there of Da-sein is 
the world “in” which Dasein exists, and the world is the experiential 
context for the truth which Dasein is always underway at uncovering. 
Dasein is also known to itself through its disclosure, in which neither 
subject nor object has priority. The middle-voice form of the Greek 
apophainesthai likewise suggests only a “showing itself” without any 
prior one-sided commitment to a subject “having” an experience and 
objectifying the phenomenon.5 The understanding of the world and the 
understanding of Dasein happen together, in a single phenomenon, the 
“co-disclosure [Miterschlossenheit] of the self” (ga 24: 225/158).
 As we open ourselves to and close ourselves off from our world, the 
phenomenological interpretation of truth shows itself to be full of rich 
connotations of a constant, inseparable interplay between what mod-
ern philosophy had set apart as a distinct subject and object. Graeme 
Nicholson claims that the description of epistemology in new terms like 
“the open” and “unconcealment” offers “some guarantee or hope that 
human inquirers can find the truth” by “suggesting the motion we and 
our object can make toward one another, with the hope of meeting and 
merging.”6 Operating on a psychological as well as philosophical level, 
the description of truth as a disclosure implies a certain intimacy, as 
when we disclose sensitive information to select company. We are on 
terms of the closest familiarity with the “there” – through the ecstatic 
projection of temporality, Dasein is the there. On a more physical level, 
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the root verb schließen connotes a shutting in, an enclosure, a locked-in 
quality accessible only to the one who has the keys, die Schlüssel.7 We 
ourselves are encased within a world of beings, which we, in turn, have 
the inherent capability to dis-cover (ent-decken). 
 In the second division of Sein und Zeit, the schließen metaphor will 
be still further developed, as the most primordial truth of Dasein is 
its authenticity, in which “resoluteness [Ent-schlossenheit] has caught 
up the possibility of death into its potentiality-for-Being” (ga 2: 407/
sz 307). Of all the realities which Dasein may uncover as true, holding 
death for true (das Für-wahr-halten des Todes) is “more primordial than 
any certainty which relates to entities encountered within-the-world” 
and so “demands Dasein in the full authenticity of its existence” (ga 
2: 351–52/sz 265). Dasein realizes the truth of its existential disclosed-
ness (Erschlossenheit) by ceasing to be at all closed off (verschlossen). 
In the phenomenon of resoluteness, Dasein fully recognizes its limita-
tion in the moment it leaves it behind, experiencing an impassioned 
“f r e e d o m t o w a r d s  d e a t h [F r e i h e i t  z u m T o d e] – a freedom 
which has been released of the illusions of the ‘they,’ and which is factical, 
certain of itself, and anxious” (ga 2: 353/sz 256). Insofar as we can say 
that Heidegger has a “criterion” by which truths are more or less pri-
mordial, the uncovering of any other truth must be less primordial than 
this authentic resoluteness, which uncovers Dasein itself as fully free. 
The most authentic truth-experience does not correspond to any exter-
nal state of affairs at all. It is rather Dasein’s own coming to terms with 
itself. Holding death for true is the self-recognition of the existential 
basis for any other holding as true. It is the truth-experience of realiz-
ing our being as a whole, of recognizing our world in its finite disclosure 
and ecstatic temporal unity. This most primordial truth-experience 
uncovers the existential basis underlying any other truth-experience.
 One may criticize Heidegger for resorting to novel metaphors in 
this description, but these are metaphors with a profound point. Find-
ing the truth is not an exercise in evaluating a correspondence relation, 
but an existential practice. As such a practice, it will never have the 




immediate, a-historical access to beings required for such a correspon-
dence is simply unattainable. Even the most authentic truth-experience 
of resolute Freiheit zum Tode always occurs in an existential context 
of Dasein’s having fallen into das Man. Heidegger’s own attempt to 
reach a primordial Greek sense of truth occurs in a socio-historical 
context in which millennia of “the they” have commented upon and 
thereby covered over the original phenomena which the Greeks were 
first encountering. This distance from the original is not the product 
of inaccurate scholarship, but an inevitable part of our nature as tem-
poral beings whose insights are always mediated through personal 
and historical time. Beings are in fact always, to some degree, in a 
state of concealment (verborgen) and must be uncovered as “a kind of 
robbery” (ga 2: 294/sz 222).
I I . world-dIsclosure of untruth wIth truth
But why should this existential truth-experience require any sort of rob-
bery? Here Heidegger’s metaphors lead us into his reading of alētheia as 
Unverborgenheit, “unconcealment.” Before turning to the Greeks, I will 
first describe unconcealment purely in Heidegger’s own terms. It can 
first be understood as a necessary consequence of the phenomenological 
method. Just as the phenomenologist recognizes what shows itself, he or 
she must also recognize that this showing itself is not exhaustive, com-
prehensive, or absolute. This methodological humility seeks to avoid 
overstepping its bounds in the traditional dogmas of metaphysics, and 
so makes space for what is not known alongside its positive claims. For 
this reason the question of the covering-up of beings appears in the 
exposition of phenomenology itself in Sein und Zeit §7, where Heidegger 
establishes that covered-up-ness “is the counter-concept [Gegenbegriff] 
to the ‘phenomenon’” (ga 2: 48/sz 36). Phenomenology, as the study 
of what shows itself, must acknowledge that it always works alongside 
what remains invisible.8
 The ways in which beings may be covered up are as varied as the 
ways in which they show themselves. They may be forgotten, buried 
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over, or deliberately disguised; they may be covered up only contin-
gently or necessarily, as part of how they present themselves by their 
very nature. Since showing-itself is always embedded in the flow of 
experience, which at times accents some beings and obscures others, 
neither the clarity nor the concealment of beings is ever permanent. 
This concealment does not pertain to any special obscurity of the entity, but 
rather to Dasein’s world contexture. In his discussion of equipment in 
Sein und Zeit §16, Heidegger emphasizes that ready-to-hand equipment, 
which is ontically nearest to Dasein, remains covered-up as an objecti-
fied, present-to-hand entity, only becoming conspicuous in its absence 
(ga 2: 101/sz 75).9 When we realize that we are most blind to what is 
nearest, concealment is understood not as some obfuscating inaccessibility, 
but as Heidegger intends, as the blind shadow of our everyday existentiell 
experience. The world in concealment is nothing more than the glasses 
sitting on our nose which go unnoticed until they have gone missing.
 The concealment of beings can also be understood through the 
analytic of Dasein, whose world is disclosed as both an opening up and 
closing-off. The disclosure of Dasein’s world in its facticity necessarily 
implies that other beings, “possibly encounterable within the world, 
have been covered up (hidden) or disguised” (ga 2: 294/sz 222). These 
beings are unconcealed in the course of living with one’s own cares 
and projects, in being “as comporting with beings [sich verhaltenedes 
Sein bei Seiendem]” (ga 24: 224/157). This existential comporting is the 
basis for the robbing in which Dasein takes beings and establishes 
their existence as something of its own possession, belonging to its 
own world. Beings must be robbed insofar as Dasein must appropri-
ate them in enacting its “mineness” (Jemeinigkeit) (ga 2: 57/sz 42). 
This appropriating uncovering of truth also applies to distant, abstract 
objects of knowledge, perhaps especially so. As Heidegger remarks in 
his discussion of historicity in Sein und Zeit §6, Dasein should eschew 
the pretense of philological objectivity and instead aim for a productive 
appropriation (produktive Aneignung) of history, snatching the past into 
its own world (ga 2: 29/sz 21). Returning to primordial sources is not 
yet another attempt to reach the long-sought “correct interpretation” 
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of disputed texts. Approaching historical thought in its original truth-
experience will necessarily mean rooting out the interpretive pre-
suppositions which have been laid upon the text, even if by its very 
authors. The truth-experience of historical texts can only be reached 
insofar as we uproot the covering under which it presents itself. A phe-
nomenological reading is necessarily a reading which makes the text 
one’s own by directly engaging for oneself the phenomena presented 
through another's interpretation. It aims not for correspondence to the 
author’s original meaning, but a hard-won, almost stolen partaking in 
his or her basic truth-experience.
 To strip Dasein of the ownness which robs beings and makes them 
its own would be to destroy its capacity for truth-experience. Such a 
scenario would be one in which we would vividly experience untruth 
as an existential deprivation of what is necessary for the authentic real-
ization of the true. It would be more characteristic of nightmares than 
anything possible in familiar lived experience, as a brief Kafkaesque 
thought experiment may illustrate. One morning we awake in the base-
ment of a stranger. We did not go to sleep in this basement, and we 
have never been in it before. Nonetheless, everything in the basement 
is totally normal – we have even been left a warm pot of coffee on the 
countertop – it is simply not ours. This is not an experience of truth, 
but of the shockingly surreal. This basement represents a complete 
break with our world. It may not be a fake or synthetic basement, but 
it lacks any significance to us, and “significance is that on this basis of 
which the world is disclosed as such” (ga 2: 190/sz 143). Dasein has 
lost its “there.” Our own (jemeinig) state of thrown facticity has been 
discarded in this mysterious second thrownness into the unfamiliar, 
eliminating the factical basis on which disclosedness depends.10 The 
immediate experience of untruth can manifest as the phenomenon of 
the surreal, which in turn depends upon the phenomenon of alienation, 
the loss of Dasein’s appropriating Jemeinigkeit in its hapless inability to 
take an utterly foreign world as its own. 
 Yet Dasein would go on as Dasein. As bizarre as our surroundings 
may be, they are not functionally different from our own bed, comb, and 
greek sources
166
coffee maker. Even as we suffered a nightmarish untruth-experience, 
we would retain some basic prior familiarity with the beings within 
the stranger’s basement. On one level, we must disown this experi-
ence, desperately attempting to supply some explanation which would 
connect us back to our world. But on another, more immediate level, 
everything around us works just as it works in the dozens of basements 
we have encountered. Until and unless someone opens the door to let 
us know what is going on, both descriptions of our situation obtain. We 
are totally lost and right at home. Truth-experience splits itself in a way 
exactly corresponding to the split in our engagement with the world. 
The average, everyday aspects of this basement experience are easily 
uncovered as ready-to-hand, while interpretations of significance, the 
Wozu,11 cannot be meaningfully formulated. 
 This nightmare magnifies the everyday existentiell reality of be-
ing at once among what is apparent and what is invisible, of being at 
once in truth and untruth. As a thrown projection whose factical care 
determines the contours of its disclosure, Dasein must, to some lesser 
degree, always be split in this way. “Only in so far as Dasein has been 
disclosed [erschlossen] has it also been closed off [verschlossen]” (ga 2: 
294/sz 222). We are always among what stands beyond the boundary of 
disclosure without appropriating it to our world. We wake up and drink 
coffee in the basement of the stranger without ever feeling at home.
 Heidegger looks to the etymology of the Greek word for truth to 
capture this element of ever-present concealment which comes along 
with Dasein’s being-in. Alētheia is originally an alpha-privative word, 
so that a-lētheia can be read in the same way we read a-typical. The 
noun lēthē ultimately comes from the verb lanthanō, “to escape notice, 
be hidden,” but also “to forget” in the middle form lanthanesthai. With 
a supplementary participle, it can acquire a sense of acting in blind self-
concealment. In Herodotus’ retelling of a legend of Croesus, the king 
laments that he dined with Adrastus, slayer of his son Atys, without 
knowing of his crime, as he “without awareness [elanthane] fed the 
murderer of his son.”12 The truth-experience begins in this darkness, 
the concealment of both the world and the wider meaning of one’s 
own blind actions. Being amongst the unknown and being ourselves 
 Saad
167
unknown is our basic state, from which we may rob truth in privative 
acts of un-concealment, un-covering. This is the understanding of be-
ing as concealed that Heraclitus approaches when he says that nature 
loves to hide itself.13 As the being that uncovers beings, yet lives among 
them in their accustomed hiddenness, “Dasein is already both in the 
truth and in untruth” (ga 2: 294–95/sz 222). 
I I I . parmenIdes: the goddess aletheIa’s paths of truth 
and untruth
Sein und Zeit §44 opens with an apparent detour into the earliest history 
of philosophy. Heidegger takes up his familiar interlocuter Parmenides, 
who inaugurated ontology by identifying Being with its perceptive un-
derstanding, setting the course of Western metaphysics as a metaphysics 
of presence. Heidegger recounts how Aristotle reports that Parmenides 
himself was forced (anankazomenos) to reckon with the phenomena.14 
Why should Aristotle speak of Parmenides as being compelled in this 
way, and why should Heidegger lead his discussion of truth with such a 
strange citation? Parmenides seems not to have heeded the phenomena 
at all. His ontology, based strictly upon logical deduction, denies the 
world as it shows itself.15 Parmenidean being-as-presence is a monad 
which negates everything dynamic in experience. Being is uncreated 
(agenēton), indestructible (anōlethron), unmoved (atremes), and unable 
to be finished, complete (ateleston).16 The past and future tenses of the 
verb also do not apply to it. It neither was nor will be, but simply is.17
 But there is more to Parmenides than this famous monism, though 
many scholars persist in treating it as his final ontological position.18 
The rest of what remains of the rest of his single poetic work On Na-
ture contradicts this interpretation. Heidegger reads Parmenides with 
a view to developing his own philosophy, but also with the intention of 
resolving ongoing questions about the unity of apparently conflicting 
Parmenidean doctrines. To these ends, he provides an interpretation of 
the whole poem which illustrates how Parmenides’ alētheia implies our 
being in untruth as well as in truth. 
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 The complications of On Nature begin with its dream-like proem in 
which the subject of the poem, presumably the author, participates in a
story of mares, a speeding chariot (with glowing and 
sounding axle), maidens (daughters of the sun), the 
House of Night, the Gates of the paths of Night and 
Day (complete with a thorough discussion of the posts, 
doors, and the keys that open them), guarded by “much-
avenging justice [dikē polupoinos].”19
Given this cacophony of quasi-Homeric imagery opening the first work of 
Western ontology, it should come as no surprise that the proem has been 
“alternatively exhaustively analyzed and ignored by commentators.”20 
Somehow the author of an extreme form of rationalism described his 
philosophy against this allegorical, mythopoetic, perhaps even occult 
horizon. The cultural distance from the ancients is here quite apparent, 
as modern scholars are hesitant to concede that “the founder of Western 
logic was a mystic and came by his knowledge through a journey to the 
underworld and divine revelation.”21
 But to Parmenides the seer and Parmenides the logician we must 
also add Parmenides the natural scientist, who laid out an apparently 
original cosmology. Following the proem and the monistic ontology, 
there is also a third and final section, the way of appearance (doxa). 
The conclusion of the monistic ontology discredits the way of appear-
ance before it is even described, disparaging the doctrines to follow as 
the mere names mortals wrongly give their experience.22 Parmenides 
then goes on to describe a world of dualisms, especially focusing on 
the opposition of light and night which recalls the meeting of Night 
and Day in the proem. Despite the disclaimer, there is some attempt to 
combine this world of difference with the static unity he posits as the 
ultimate ontology. Since logical necessity demands that “what is not” 
does not exist, the duality of light and night must be only apparent, the 
concealing untruth in which we live. Neither can slip into non-being, 
so everything must contain both light and night equally.23
 Saad
168
 This reconciliation of ontology with experience is what Aristotle 
refers to when he describes Parmenides as being forced to heed the 
phenomena, a comment which has been sorely overlooked in one-sided 
modern interpretations of Parmenides as a pure monist. However logically 
rigorous his ontology may have been, Parmenides could not stand in 
sheer obstinacy against the phenomena of time, change, and difference, 
and so he wrote the second half of his poem even as he disowned it. For 
Heidegger, such “regression” into untruth is Dasein’s falling into “the 
They” (das Man), in which it is invariably given over to inauthentic 
“idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity,” the sort of inexact prejudices Par-
menides characterizes as the way of appearance. Falling is inescapable, 
as permanent uncoveredness is not possible within a temporal world 
contexture. Some things will invariably show themselves as mere sem-
blance, while what has been previously uncovered “sinks back again, 
hidden and disguised. Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of 
Being is such that it is in ‘untruth’” (ga 2: 294–95/sz 222–23).24 
 The fact that a figure as foundational as Parmenides would spend 
his time developing doctrines he himself conceded to be less than fully 
true lends strong credibility to Heidegger’s reading of alētheia.25 Hei-
degger is correct in taking the poem as a whole because Parmenides’ 
ontology depends upon its contrast with the world of appearances, which 
must be recognized in at least this negating sense. The alpha-privative 
negative properties of Being (a-genēton, an-ōlethron, a-tremes) only ac-
quire sense as the negation of the creation, destruction, and motion 
experienced in the phenomena. The proem serves to distinguish these 
paths as routes of varied unconcealment, as the goddess definitively 
deems “the solid heart of well-rounded Unveiling [Alētheiēs eukykleos]” 
superior to the “beliefs [doxas] of mortals, in which there is no uncon-
cealed reliability [ouk.. pistis alēthēs].”26 Alētheia encompasses both the 
monist path of truth and the error of the mortal path. As Heidegger will 
maintain in his own account of truth, the lesser path is described not as 
false in a contrary sense, but with a double negative, as that which has 
not been fully uncovered, and so cannot be reliable. 
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 The allegorical details of the scene further suggest that Parmenides 
presents his doctrines as a religiously mediated unveiling. As our jour-
ney to full unconcealment begins, the daughters of the Sun, rushing 
to meet Parmenides, have “thrown back their veils [kalyptras].”27 They 
journey to the gates of Day and Night, the junction of what has been 
unveiled and what remains in concealment, corresponding to the two 
accounts the goddess will give. Heidegger believes that Alētheia her-
self is the ambiguous goddess of the poem through whose voice the 
philosophic doctrines are delivered. The proem is not something to be 
skipped over, but the first illustration of what Heidegger is attempting 
to retrieve in Sein und Zeit over two millennia later. The interpretation 
of Parmenides has such an important connection with his own project 
that he pauses in the middle of his explanation of the truth-experience 
in Sein und Zeit §44 to give his theory of the proem:
The goddess of Truth who guides Parmenides, puts two 
pathways before him, one of uncovering, one of hid-
ing; but this signifies nothing else than that Dasein is 
already both in the truth and in untruth. The way of 
uncovering is achieved only in krinein logō, in distin-
guishing between these understandingly, and making 
one’s decision for the one rather than the other (ga 2: 
294–95/sz 222–23).
 In his 1926 Marburg lecture course Basic Concepts of Ancient Philos-
ophy, Heidegger’s fragmentary notes further develop this Parmenidean 
acceptance of untruth alongside truth. “To the Being of truth belongs 
essentially the untruth. Proof that error has its foundation, in whatever 
way it has entered the world” (ga 22: 64/53). Untruth also belongs to 
the phenomenal “letting itself show” of the truth-experience, in which 
errors are revealed as errors. It is only possible to give an account of an 
error as an untruth after one has had a truth-experience by which to 
recognize error as error. In Parmenides’ cosmology, only light or dark-
ness may show itself, but, after we learn the ontological truth that what 
“is not” cannot be, we realize that both must always be present. To take 
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an example from modern science, the untruth of the geocentric theory 
of the solar system is co-disclosed in the truth-experience of the helio-
centric theory of the solar system. A refutation or proof of impossible 
consequences may win debating points, but such arid demonstrations 
contribute nothing to the rich phenomenal awareness of untruth, in 
which error is fully uncovered as the counter-concept of proper under-
standing.28 A real sense of the false only arises in the truth-experience 
itself, through which “error is understood in its origin” (ga 22: 64/54).
 Plato also briefly echoes this point in the enigmatic dialogue Hippias 
Minor, where Socrates argues that only an expert in a field can effec-
tively lie about it. The expert has a truth-experience which makes him 
most powerful (dynatōtatos) to tell truths and lies alike (366e-369a). 
The ability to distinguish between them by their account (krinein logō) 
arises only in a state of existential unconcealment. The truth-experience 
that unlocks truths alongside untruths is mythically allegorized as an 
initiation by Parmenides and is later secularized by Plato as the phe-
nomenon of expertise.
 Heidegger’s reading of alētheia is deeply indebted to his original 
interpretation of Parmenides. Phenomenological ontology emerges as 
the natural solution to the ongoing scholarly question of the poem’s 
unity, recognizing and resolving the patent contradiction between his 
strictly monist ontological commitments and the dualist cosmology in 
the second half of On Nature. Taking what shows itself on a proper 
phenomenological basis, ontology can properly take beings as never 
showing themselves fully, as always being at once in truth and untruth. 
Western philosophy set itself down the wrong path towards an atem-
poral metaphysics of presence precisely when it discarded the second 
half of On Nature. In the very fact that Parmenides’ monistic ontology 
was far better preserved than his natural cosmology, we see the tradi-
tion covering up the eventual reconciliation with the phenomena which 
Aristotle reported as the ancient reading of Parmenides. The positive 
meaning and importance of untruth has remained hidden ever since.
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Iv. heraclItus: the hermeneutIc logos clearIng the lethe 
Parmenides’ goddess distinguishes between the two paths by judging 
between them based on their logos, krinein logō. 29 Alētheia, as an act of 
uncovering, always results from an interpretive practice. Heidegger 
understands the logos as the hermeneutical operator which accomplishes 
unconcealment, signifying “entities in the ‘how’ of their uncoveredness” 
(ga 2: 290/sz 219). In making this philological case, Heidegger stands on 
more established ground, as logos is a word of more established etymo-
logical interest than alētheia.30 It is the nominal form of legō, a verb 
with a semantic range wide enough to include definitions as varied 
as “gather,” “choose,” “count,” and “say.”31 One definition of the verb 
given by LSJ is straightforwardly hermeneutic: “to wish to say,” “to 
mean.”32 The gathering, choosing, and counting of entities represents 
the hermeneutic activity involved in giving a logos, which brings out 
the “how” of uncoveredness Heidegger seeks. Ultimately, the logos 
“means rather the same as dēloun [to make visible]: to make manifest 
what one is ‘talking about’ in one’s discourse” (ga 2: 43/sz 32).
 Heidegger philologically develops the logos as the “how” of uncov-
ering in Sein und Zeit §44 with a treatment of Heraclitus’ first fragment 
(likely from the start of his lost book). The logos is a primary philo-
sophical concept for Heraclitus, which he describes as lifting us out of 
a state of dreamy forgetfulness, accomplishing unconcealment. Hei-
degger describes this first fragment (below) as an account in which “the 
phenomenon of truth in the sense of uncoveredness… shows though” 
(ga 2: 290/sz 219). 
But of this principle which holds forever [the logos] 
people prove ignorant, not only before they hear it, but 
also once they have heard it. For although everything 
happens in accordance with this principle, they resem-
ble those with no familiarity with it, even after they 
have become familiar with the kinds of accounts and 
events I discuss as I distinguish each thing accord to 
its nature and explain its constitution. But the general 
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run of people are as unaware [lanthanei] of their actions 
while awake as they are of what they do [i.e. forget, 
epilanthanontai] when they are asleep.33
Though the logos is that which brings to unconcealment, some people 
are wholly unsensitive to it, and so they proceed without understanding. 
Like Parmenides, Heraclitus grants that untruth is our basic state and 
so grants in advance the limitation of the logos he will present.
 Truth as unconcealment here appears as an original metaphor 
separate from any interposition of the nominal form alētheia. The 
uncovering logos negates what lies at the root of a-lētheia, the lēthē, 
“hiddenness, concealedness.” Heidegger’s alētheia can be seen in its 
original composite parts: the hermeneutic logos which clears away the 
concealing lēthē. The lēthē appears in the two forms of the middle verb 
lanthanesthai, “to forget,” a concealing to oneself of what was once 
known, Dasein’s falling into untruth from prior unconcealment. The 
logos can take us out of the dream-like state in which the human be-
ing persists, blind to the word and not even self-aware in memory. As 
with Herodotus’ Croesus, the lēthē is not just an unawareness of be-
ings, but, more profoundly, an existential state of self-blindness. Hei-
degger finds this fragment so philologically convincing that he deems 
those who would persist without a primordial reading of alētheia as 
“cover[ing] up the meaning of what the Greeks made ‘self-evidently’ 
basic for the terminological use of alētheia as a pre-philosophical way 
of understanding it” (ga 2: 291/sz 219).
v. pl ato: ascent through a gradatIon of aletheia , 
a priori dIsclosedness as anamnesis
Post-Socratic philosophy becomes increasingly interested in more techni-
cal questions of epistemology, erecting theories of truth which are less 
obviously disclosive of primordial alētheia. It is indeed doubtful whether 
Heidegger would have ever had these ideas if not for Diels and Kranz’s 
groundbreaking publication of a scholarly edition of the pre-Socratic 
fragments in 1903. Philosophers comfortably read Plato and Aristotle 
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for two thousand years without translating alētheia as “uncoveredness” 
because their views could more easily be brought to accord with the 
correspondence theory of truth dominant in medieval and modern phi-
losophy. The later Heidegger will indeed himself regard Plato as the one 
who replaced the primordial sense of alētheia with a new sense of truth 
as correctness, leading into later theories of correspondence.34 
 The early Heidegger, however, finds the primordial truth-experi-
ence in his phenomenological readings of Plato and Aristotle. The two 
founding figures of systematic Western philosophy directly reckoned 
with the truth as a phenomenon. Their proto-phenomenological instincts 
have been concealed in centuries of metaphysical interpretation, which 
takes these thinkers as representing archetypically “idealist” and “real-
ist” positions. Heidegger is unfortunately not very explicit on this point, 
but his comments on Aquinas and the correspondence theory of truth 
in Sein und Zeit §44 strongly suggest that the “primordial” Aristotle 
and Plato are Aristotle and Plato prior to Christian and Neo-Platonic 
reinterpretation.35 At the very least, their philosophies only became 
metaphysical in and through their primordial engagement with the 
phenomena, which can be uncovered in a reading sensitive to the truth-
experience more readily seen in their pre-Socratic predecessors. While 
this post-Socratic development of truth-experience is not explicitly de-
scribed in Sein und Zeit §44, Heidegger’s Marburg lectures on Greek 
thought, later published as Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy and 
Plato’s “Sophist,” outline how alētheia as uncoveredness persists as an 
implicit theme in later Greek philosophy. 
 Plato’s metaphors of ascent from a lower world of sense to the 
higher world of pure noetic intellection express a locational distinction 
between the realm of truth and the realm of appearance.36 Dualism 
seems to be the consequence of such a distinction, yet Heidegger resists 
the tradition of treating Plato as a dogmatic metaphysician. He rather 
praises Plato for creating an enduring set of problems “always under-
way, approached [in] obscurity.” The work of Plato is eternal precisely 
because it does not contain “some finished, so-called eternal truth” and 
instead “asks actual questions.” Platonic thought resounds not because 
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of the strength of the theory of forms, but rather because it represents 
“actual work in disclosing the phenomena” (ga 22: 142–43/118).
 Heidegger’s approach to Plato in this early period is unapologeti-
cally Aristotelian, as even the Marburg lecture course on Plato’s Sophist 
begins with an extensive excursus on alētheuein in Aristotle. Every 
interpretation of Plato must ultimately legitimate itself in Aristotle, 
whose more direct engagement with the phenomena is a continuation 
of the Platonic project. Aristotle and Plato are engaging the same set of 
fundamental phenomenal problems which Aristotle brought into fur-
ther clarity. What the tradition has interpreted as a distinctly Aristote-
lian realist position is simply the full uncovering of what has remained 
concealed in Platonic aporia. An understanding of Aristotle supplies the 
“guiding lines” which makes possible the realization of Plato’s “im-
manent intentions” (ga 19: 189–90/132).
 Plato’s metaphysical account of being is an attempt to give an ac-
count of Dasein’s uncovering of the phenomena within in a world. The 
allegory of the cave is nothing other than a quite explicit metaphor 
for being-in. Being-in the cave involves levels of disclosedness, levels 
differentiated by the relative amount of light present in each of them. 
This light is the uncovering of beings at in their gradation of phe-
nomenal clarity, as shadows, appearances, and forms. This increase of 
light is analogous to the movement from the ontic to the ontological, 
“overturning of the entire current basic position of Dasein itself with 
respect to what it takes at any level as a genuine being” (ga 22: 102–5). 
Crucially, the levels of disclosedness continue down into the darkness 
of the cave, so that no point on the spectrum is ever entirely “unreal,” 
but only wholly obscure. Heidegger deems Plato “the discoverer of the 
a priori” (ga 24: 463–64), which grants “a surrounding world, even if 
accessible only to a small degree… [which] is always already disclosed 
with Dasein” (ga 22: 102).
 In developing this spectrum of unconcealedness, Plato makes him-
self answerable to what happens at the extrema of the continuum. At 
the top lies the form of the good, which Heidegger reads convention-
ally as “the fundamental truth itself, which makes possible all other 
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truths” (ga 22: 106). It is Heidegger’s interpretation of the bottom of the 
continuum that is quite ingenious. If we extend the continuum of 
uncoveredness down to its lowest limit, we describe beings which are 
entirely covered, about which we have no knowledge at all. Yet Hei-
degger demonstrates how Plato preserves the a priori disclosedness of 
Dasein’s world even when it comports with beings which have been en-
tirely concealed. According to Plato’s doctrine of anamnēsis, articulated 
in the dialogues Meno and Phaedrus, what lies entirely in concealment 
may seem unknowable,37 but it has only been forgotten, existentially 
concealed. How would a knower recognize something as known with-
out having already known it? Full concealment is just the forgetting 
(lanthanesthai) Heraclitus finds in those who do not heed the logos. As 
the famous demonstration of the uneducated slave’s understanding of 
geometry in the Meno makes clear, the forgottenness of our knowledge 
makes it possible for it to return through questioning which facilitates 
our discovery of the logos, with no positive teaching being necessary. 
Temporary ignorance does not break the continuity of world-disclosure.
 Because “the possibility of comportment toward beings demands a 
precursory understanding of being” (ga 24: 463/325). Plato’s a priori 
is interpreted as a temporal feature of Dasein’s existential being, a pri-
ority in time. A secularized form of anamnēsis is present in the truth-
experience, in which the world contexture of Dasein pre-discloses what 
has yet to be fully uncovered. This anticipatory sense can be seen in 
everyday phenomenal extrapolation. I will have a vague idea of what 
honey-baked chicken may taste like even if I have never eaten it. I 
can make a meaningful projection of the taste by remembering and 
combining the taste of all the other varieties of chicken and sweets I 
have consumed. Only an understanding of truth as alētheia allows these 
subtle extrapolating permutations of the truth-experience to suggest 
themselves, recognizing the daily experience of partial knowing lost 
in the strict binary between the true and the false.
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vI. arIstotle: varIed modes of exIstentIal aletheia ,  
apophantIc assertIon as dIspl ay
Aristotle opens his Metaphysics by declaring that “all human beings 
desire knowledge by their nature.”38 Just like Heidegger, Aristotle speaks 
of knowledge as inherently bound up with the Existenz of the human 
being. Heidegger interprets the activity of alētheuein for Aristotle as 
“to take out of concealment” through “varied modes of disclosing and 
understanding, pre-theoretically” (ga 22: 25). Knowledge arises by 
nature, physei, and not as a “supplementary faculty.” The first book 
of the Metaphysics thus situates knowledge as belonging to Dasein’s 
existentialia. The human being’s varied truth-experiences exist in a 
hierarchy corresponding to the levels of uncoveredness examined above 
in Plato, presenting “the manifold of possibilities and of modes of dis-
closing in a certain gradation” (ga 22: 24–25/20).
 Aristotle’s movement through the levels of existential capacity 
for knowledge parallels the Platonic ascent to the forms. At the lowest 
level lies aisthēsis, sense perception, which, for Aristotle, “is common 
to all, easy, and has nothing to do with Wisdom.”39 Although sense 
perception is valid, as the senses are the “chief sources of knowledge 
about particulars,” they do not give an account (legousi) of the to dia 
ti, the reason for what is phenomenally given.40 Between aisthēsis 
and sophia, the bookends of Aristotle’s spectrum of human knowl-
edge, there lie increasingly complex logoi, interpretive accounts. Ani-
mals41 share with human beings sense perception, along with memory 
(mnēmē) and, to some degree, experience (empeiria).42 Crucially for 
Heidegger, memory and experience are an expansion of perception 
across the dimensions of time, such that they foreground the possibil-
ity of a world-contexture, enabling “freer orientation, circumspection, 
to take in at a glance” as opposed to living continually within the 
purely sensory phenomenon of encountering something for the first 
time. This makes beings possessing memory “more teachable,” as they 
are “not merely (perceptual) staring at, not simply bound to one and 
the same present (possibility)” (ga 22: 25/21).43
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 Dasein, the possessor of technē, has a still deeper practical interpre-
tation of experience, knowing the to dioti kai tēn aitian, “the reason why 
and the cause.”44 Technē interprets the world with greater temporal 
depth, as it “already also has its anticipation” so that it knows “the 
connection of the if this-then that,” reaching “a factual connection that 
holds without exception.”45 This understanding of technē is a further 
unveiling which arises “out of the “empirically [experientially] given,” 
an unveiling which shows the being as it “always and properly is,” 
arriving at conceptual knowledge (ga 22: 26/21–22). At each level a 
further interpretation of what simply shows itself in perception arises, 
and these interpretations manifest in the capabilities and projects of 
Dasein. The ability of those with technē to teach is a sign (sēmeion) 
that technē is more a form of epistēmē than empeiria. As something 
learned, a technē involves a communicable logos, while empeiria neces-
sarily remains the property of the individual. 
 In so describing the necessary relationship between the activities 
of the human being and the disclosure of truth, the first chapter of the 
Metaphysics very closely resonates with Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. 
Because each level of disclosure depends upon a successively deeper 
hermeneutic logos, we never permanently achieve full alētheia, instead 
living in and out of truth. In a recognition of temporality, life demands 
that we acquire some logoi, forget others, and occasionally master a few. 
Uncovering in all its forms occurs through our very nature and does not 
depend on a theoretical interpretation of truth. 
 But Heidegger charges that all later Western philosophy has ne-
glected this core of Aristotelian epistemology and instead focused on 
Aristotle’s more limited remarks on propositions. In On Interpretation, 
Aristotle claims that exhibitive (aufweisend) speech alone is the only 
context where “trueness [to alētheuein] and falseness [to pseudesthai] 
occur”.46 Back in the Metaphysics, Aristotle holds that truth and falsity 
do not belong to objects, but to the synthetic judgements we make about 
them, judgements which Scholasticism in turn designated as beings 
of reason, ens rationis.47 In a sense, Heidegger is simply passing by the 
intensive development of this propositional project in modern formal 
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logic, eschewing it entirely in favor of his description of truth-experience. 
As Graeme Nicholson points out, Heidegger is open to accusations that he 
has ignored the discourse about truth and simply discussed the “context 
of [its] discovery.”48 But even accepting this criticism, Heidegger’s descrip-
tion of the truth-experience demonstrates how the current formalism 
of propositional truth has restricted deeper thought on the matter. Propo-
sitional truth is presented as a binary of true and false, but the experi-
ential variety of world-contexture demands “more than the traditional 
two truth-values.”49 An obscurity, a deception, and an honest error lose 
their particular experiential richness when flattened into the category 
“the false.” As Aristotle demonstrates in Metaphysics i, the uncovering 
practices of alētheuein must also be maintained in their distinctiveness. 
The coincidental birdwatcher and an expert ornithologist cannot be said 
to perceive “the true” about birds in any univocal sense. Aisthēsis and 
epistēmē are two entirely different phenomena.
 Heidegger thus interprets the tradition’s dwelling on propositions 
as a narrow focus on asserting, which is only “one of Dasein’s intentional 
comportments” (ga 24: 295/207). Truth may only apply to assertion 
(Aussage), but assertion belongs only to Dasein as the logos apophan-
tikos, the logos through which beings show themselves so that affirmation 
and denial, truth and falsity apply.50 Apophansis is the same Greek word 
through which Heidegger discussed phenomenology as a “letting show 
itself” of the phenomena in Sein und Zeit §7 (ga 2: 45–47/sz 34–35). 
The logos apophantikos is the logos that accomplishes a letting show 
(-phainesthai) of the being from itself (apo-), as it really is, an assertion 
of the being as unconcealed, as in truth. Heidegger, following Aristotle, 
describes the form of assertion as both diairetic and synthetic, at once 
distinguishing and integrating a subject and predicate to make a judge-
ment (ga 2: 211/sz 159; ga 24: 292–95). 
 But even true assertions will not take us entirely into truth and out 
of untruth. Assertion highlights some aspect of the being in definite 
predication while other aspects become concealed in their being put out 
of display, their being excluded from the assertion. There is an intimate 
parallel between this synthesizing structure of assertion as conjunction 
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and disjunction and how beings show themselves in uncoveredness and 
coveredness. Assertion only uncovers what matters to Dasein. It is one 
of Dasein’s existential comportments, which always have an intentional 
basis in marking beings in a significantly determinate way. Judgements 
form because Dasein wants to predicate what matters in a being. This 
directed intentionality is seen in the prefix of Aristotle’s term dianoia, 
a thinking through (dia-) a being for a relevant determination, grasp-
ing it with a purpose in mind, to see it as being in a certain way. This 
dianoetic “looking through” arrives at the apophantic “as structure” in 
assertion, a being’s presenting itself as being in a certain way. But the 
presentation must also have its Gegenbegriff, its counterpart in what 
is not presented. The apophantic as structure through which beings 
show themselves also conceals them, as it an inherently two-sided 
“structure of the understanding and disclosing, of uncoveredness and 
coveredness” (ga 22: 164–66/138).
 Making assertions is an activity of Dasein as finite and concern-
ful as any other. Dasein crafts its assertions, hoping to accomplish the 
exhibition (Aufzeigung) of a being, a featuring of it as being on display 
(Aufweisung) (ga 24: 295–300).51 One implication of this turn of meta-
phor is that a display cannot be compared against the real thing, as 
the correspondence theory of truth demands. As Sean McGrath writes, “the 
proposition does not call for comparison but confirmation (Ausweis).52 
The proposition is confirmed (ausgewiesen) in the thing or not.”53 Every 
display is constructed within a social, communicative context in which 
Dasein practices the ongoing activity of confirming truth. Assertions 
belong to discourse as a “primordial existentiale of disclosedness” (ga 
2: 214/sz 161). The “communicatively determinant exhibition” of asser-
tion in which truth and falsehood are always at stake is most evident 
in scientific discussion, but even in this context “assertion has not a 
primary cognitive function but a secondary one” (ga 24: 299–300/210). 
 Retrieving the wider scope of Aristotle’s view of human knowledge, 
Heidegger’s main point about propositional assertion is negative. We do 
not live, work, or even think in purely propositional terms. In showing 
an entity “as” an entity, the apophantical as-structure of a proposition 
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depends upon the more primordial circumspective act of interpretation, 
the “existential-hermeneutic as” (ga 2: 210/sz 158). The proposition 
“The sun is most severe at noon” is merely a display of how we have 
gathered together (per the logos) our experiences of the severity of the 
sun and interpreted them (per the hermeneutic “as”). Assertion only 
arises when we attempt to present this interpretation to other Dasein. 
Displaying truth is an intentional putting together of some aspect of 
one’s world on display for verification, but also for comparison, criti-
cism, and revision. There are many more possibilities for the reception 
of a proposition than deeming it true or false. It may also be dismissed 
as vague or unthinkingly accepted as obvious. This wide range of phe-
nomenal responses which a proposition may prompt cannot be made 
to fit on the Procrustean bed of logical formalism. Graeme Nicholson 
suggests a behavioral adverb as an alternative to the adjective “true” or 
the noun “the truth”: “‘He spoke truly’ has more in common with ‘He 
spoke loudly’ than has usually been seen.”54 As a phenomenon, truth-
experience loses its solid, nominal character and adverbially modifies 
the behavioral existentialia. 
 In this highly unconventional account of propositional truth, it is 
evident that Heidegger’s primordial truth-experience reverses the usual 
epistemic priorities. For Heidegger, error is a precondition of being as 
we are, of existing within a finite, factical world-disclosure. We can 
only consider the elimination of error as a deliberate, intentional fea-
ture of exact communication when we manifest the truth-experience 
in discourse, placing beings on display and presenting them as being-
uncovered to other Dasein. True assertion is the carefully crafted dis-
play of a final draft, the moment at which an uncovered being may be 
seen in its best display, as if it were not first taken out of concealment, 
as if it were something immediately given as present-at-hand. 
 Yet the existential moment of recognizing the true as true, the truth-
experience, belongs to the pages of buried drafts which robbed the phe-
nomena from their hiddenness. In the immediate activity of doing research 
we are always uncovering truth without any self-conscious presumption 




state of affairs beyond and separate from our ever-searching inquiry. 
Though, if asked, we may speak of truth in these terms, this beyond 
is only an illusion which arises when we treat propositions as if they 
really had delivered beings in a never-having-been-concealed clarity. 
The proposition does not speak from the pure beyond, but through the 
darkly diaphanous world the German poet Matthias Claudius compared 
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1 Among philosophers, Ernst Tugendhat made the most widely 
influential postwar critique of Heidegger’s theory of truth. Tu-
gendhat claimed that seeing the true proposition as that which 
uncovers simply substitutes one problematic criterion of truth as 
correspondence for another flawed criterion of truth as uncon-
cealment. “One simply cannot see that towards which the true 
assertion is directed as merely consisting in the self-showing, in 
un-concealment as such. For the false assertion is also directed 
towards something that shows itself.” Ernst Tugendhat, “Hei-
degger’s Idea of Truth,” in Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, 
Vol. 3, edited and translated by Christopher Macann, (London: 
Routledge, 1992), 85. As this paper will demonstrate, this criti-
cism proceeds from a strictly propositional view of truth, which 
Heidegger aims to replace with an existential account.
  Among philologists, the influential Paul Friedländer criti-
cized Heidegger’s reading of alētheia in his 1954 work Platon. 
Friedländer largely focuses on responding to the later Heidegger’s 
comments on Platonic philosophy as marking a pivot to correspon-
dence theory in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” “Platons Lehre von 
der Wahrheit,” and the Parmenides lecture course. Friedländer 
does point out that Homeric characters refer to spoken assertions 
as alēthēs, suggesting that even the earliest Greeks had a sense of 
alētheia similar to the modern sense of truth as correspondence 
between a statement and a set of affairs. Plato cannot have been 
the pivot point the later Heidegger believes him to be. Heidegger 
himself acknowledges and concedes this point in a colloquium 
in Paris in 1964 (published in German in 1969 as “Das Ende der 




retraction has not made much of an impression on the scholar-
ship on the topic. He continued to uphold the Greeks as having 
an access to Being lost in modernity, etymology aside. For a clear 
exposition and commentary on the debate, see Rui de Sousa, Mar-
tin Heidegger’s Interpretation of Ancient Greek Aletheia and the 
Philological Response to it, Ph.D. diss. (McGill University, 2000), 
https://escholarship.mcgill.ca/concern/theses/5h73px702.
  I do not see why the more modern sense of truth as correctness 
Friedländer documented in Homer cannot have existed alongside 
the primordial sense of privative a-lētheia Heidegger uncovers; this 
would simply be a common case of linguistic polysemy. 
2 The adjective ursprünglich appears at the sub-section heading 
“The Primordial Phenomenon of Truth and the Derivative Char-
acter of the Traditional Conception of Truth” (ga 2: 290/219). 
The phrase is particularly evocative of how Heidegger’s position 
differs from the traditional discourse on truth, and indeed it is 
given great emphasis in §44. “Indeed, the term Wahrheitsphän-
omen occurs so frequently throughout §44 (nineteen times in all) 
that we are justified in taking it to name his principal topic in 
the section”: Graeme Nicholson, “Truth as a Phenomenon,” The 
Review of Metaphysics 68:4 (2015): 805. I will be translating and 
referring to Wahrheitsphänomen and Phänomen der Wahrheit as 
“truth-experience” in order to more vividly accent the special 
existential, experiential character of this approach in English.
3 Sean McGrath, “The Interpretive Structure of Truth in Hei-
degger,” Analecta Hermeneutica 1 (2009): 54–55.
4 Koskela elaborates this point: “Heidegger thinks that we encoun-
ter entities as beings that are only in virtue of the world within 
which they can be disclosed and encountered… Dasein, a worldly 
human being, is constituted by its way of being in the world… 
Unconcealment is a worldly thing, so to speak, and human be-
ing is a necessary constitutive part of that world, and vice versa”: 
Jani Koskela, “Truth as Unconcealment in Heidegger’s Being and 
Time,” Minerva: An Internet Journal of Philosophy 16 (2012): 118–19. 
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5 Heidegger notes phainesthai as a middle form at ga 2: 38/28. The 
Greek middle voice is neither active nor passive, and so is of inter-
est to phenomenologists seeking to overcome prior commitments 
to the transitive language of subjects and objects. 
6 Nicholson makes these comments in the context of presenting 
Pietersma’s critique of Heidegger’s theory of truth: Graeme Nich-
olson, Illustrations of Being (London: Humanities Press, 1992), 75.
7 Aufschließen, which Heidegger equates with the “laying open” of 
beings in disclosedness (ga 2: 101/75), also means “to unlock.”
8 Andrzej Serafin has written about Heidegger’s wider interest in 
creating a “phenomenology of the invisible.” “Heidegger’s atti-
tude towards physics and metaphysics, his theory of truth, his 
reading of Aristotle, his concept of Dasein, his understanding of 
nothingness are all situated within the problematic context of 
the relation between the invisible and the revealed. Heidegger’s 
thought is thereby posited at the point of intersection of phenom-
enology, ontology, and theology”: Serafin, “Heidegger’s Phenom-
enology of the Invisible,” Argument: Biannual Philosophical 
Journal 6:2 (2016): 313.
9 This is actually Heidegger’s first reference to disclosedness in Sein 
und Zeit, which arises in a discussion of how equipment, though 
undiscovered insofar as it functions as equipment, is nonetheless 
part of the world-disclosure.
10 ga 2: 293/221 connects the thrownness of Dasein with its disclos-
edness. Thrownness “is constitutive for Dasein’s disclosedness. In 
thrownness is revealed that in each case Dasein, as my Dasein 
and this Dasein, is already in a definite world and alongside a 
definite range of definite entities within the world. Disclosedness 
is essentially factical.”
11 Sein und Zeit §18 discusses how such determinations of signifi-
cance arise from the contexture of a world.
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Bohn, 1778), 184–86.
greek sources
